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Abstract
AUDITOR SIZE AND AUDIT QUALITY: A PARTNER-LEVEL PERSPECTIVE
by
Yu Zhou
Advisor: Professor Masako Darrough
This study examines the effect of auditor size on audit quality at the level of audit partners. Auditor
size is defined by three criteria: the wealth of the audit partners; the size of the partners’ client
portfolios; and the number of audit partners in the firm. Using data from China, where disclosure
of the identity of the engagement audit partner is required, I hypothesize and find that the personal
wealth of an audit partner has two effects on audit quality: the income effect and the substitution
effect. The Chinese audit market is particularly suited to study these two effects. Prior to 2010,
most audit firms in China were organized in the form of limited liability corporations, in which
the personal wealth of an audit partner was shielded from legal liability. In 2010, however, all
audit firms in China were required to reorganize as limited liability partnerships, in which
negligent audit partners had unlimited liability. I find that the wealth of an audit partner negatively
affected audit quality in the period from 2007 to 2009, while in the period from 2010 to 2012 the
wealth of an audit partner took an inverted-U-shape relation to audit quality. In contrast to prior
studies, I examine two aspects of client portfolio size for an audit partner: the total assets of the
client portfolio of an audit partner, which measure the busyness effect; and the total audit fees of
an audit partner, which measure her/his total quasi-rents. I find that the total assets of the client
portfolio of an audit partner has a negative association with audit quality, while the total audit fees
for an audit partner are positively related to audit quality. In addition, I find that the number of
audit partners in an audit firm is negatively associated with audit quality.
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Chapter 1: Introduction
There is a large body of literature that examines the relationship between auditor size (e.g.,
the number of clients, and total audit fees) and audit quality. The prior theoretical literature
generally argues that larger auditors (in terms of client portfolio size and personal wealth) exhibit
higher audit quality. Several explanations have been offered for the positive relationship between
auditor size and audit quality. DeAngelo (1981) argues that larger auditors have stronger incentives
to provide high audit quality because they have more client-specific quasi-rents to lose if an audit
failure occurs; one failure may cause a reputation loss that will threaten retention of other clients.
Dye (1993) argues that auditors with more wealth at risk from litigation (“deeper pockets”) have
more incentives to issue accurate audit reports. Economies of scale are another factor in the higher
audit quality found in larger firms (Simunic and Stein 1987).
Empirical studies generally also find that large auditors exhibit higher audit quality. One
strand of research examines the difference in audit quality between big N auditors and non-big N
auditors. A large number of studies use a variety of audit-quality proxies and find evidence
suggesting that Big N auditors provide higher-quality audits (e.g., Palmrose 1988; Becker et al.
1998; Khurana and Raman 2004; Behn et al. 2008). However Louis (2005), who studies the effect
of auditor choice on acquirers’ stock price around merger announcements, finds that acquirers
audited by non-Big 4 accounting firms outperform those audited by big 4 firms.
Another strand of research studies the effect of auditor merger on audit quality and finds
that audit quality increases after a merger.1 However, the empirical studies on the relation between

1

Ding and Jia (2012) focus on the merger of PriceWaterhouse and Coopers & Lybrand in 1998
and find that audit quality during the post-merger period increased for the merged firm compared
with other big auditors. Chan and Wu (2010) study the effect of two types of auditor merger in
the Chinese audit market and find evidence supporting the argument of DeAngelo (1981).
1

audit firm size and audit quality are confounded by a number of factors. One potential issue
associated with prior research on big N auditors is endogeneity. Since the selection of auditors by
clients is non-random, the difference in audit quality documented in prior research may reflect
only the difference in the characteristics of an audit firm’s client portfolio. The study by Lawrence
et al. (2011) employs propensity-score and attribute-based matching models, and finds that
differences in audit quality between Big 4 and non-Big 4 auditors largely reflect client
characteristics and, more specifically, client size. The competence of an audit partner is another
factor in audit quality. Dopuch and Simunic (1980a, b) argue that auditors in large audit firms are
more competent than those in small firms because large audit firms are better able to recruit
graduates from leading universities, hire reputable specialists, and offer better training to their staff.
The superior audit quality supplied by large audit firms may, therefore, be attributed to the superior
competence of their partners.
The majority of prior studies treat an audit firm as a black box. These studies elide the fact
that there are usually one or several partners in a firm. In contrast to the studies on audit quality at
the firm level, DeFond and Francis (2005) argue that analysis at the audit partner level provides a
more powerful test and sheds more light on the underlying determinants of audit quality.
Answering the call from DeFond and Francis (2005) for auditing research at the individual auditor
level, a growing body of literature demonstrates that the individual characteristics of audit partners
are related to audit quality. 2 Following this line of research, this paper attempts to provide a
comprehensive study of the effect of auditor size on audit quality at the partner level. Whereas
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The attributes of audit partners examined by prior studies include tenure (Carey and Simnett
2006; Chen, Lin, and Lin 2008), economic bonding with clients (Chen, Sun, and Wu 2010),
industry expertise (Chin and Chi 2009; Zerni 2012; Goodwin and Wu 2014), and demographic
characteristics (Gul, Wu, and Yang 2013).
2

prior studies measure the size of an auditor at the firm level, utilizing the size of the client portfolio
of an audit firm as the major measure, the present study looks inside the firm to examine the
number of audit partners, and the portfolio size of each, as factors in audit quality. In agreement
with Dye (1993), I use the personal wealth of an audit partner as another measure of auditor size.
My research utilizes as measures of auditor size: (1) the size of the client portfolio per audit partner;
(2) the number of audit partners; and (3) the wealth of each audit partner. I then examine the effect
of auditor size on audit quality.
The first measure is the size of the client portfolio of an audit partner. This paper examines
two effects that an audit partner’s portfolio size has on audit quality: the busyness effect and the
loss of quasi-rents. According to DeAngelo (1981), an audit firm with a larger number of clients
exhibits higher quality because firms with more clients have more quasi-rents to lose in the event
of an audit failure. DeAngelo (1981) points out that the incentives to protect quasi-rents also apply
to an audit partner. An audit partner with a large number of clients has an incentive to provide
higher audit quality to protect his/her quasi-rents. However, according to the management
literature on busy directors who hold multiple board seats, the client-portfolio size of an audit
partner has a countervailing influence due to a busyness effect. Since hours and ability to
concentrate are limited, directors sitting on multiple boards have to divide their time and attention
among multiple tasks. The busyness effect suggests that busy directors holding multiple board
seats are less effective in their monitoring functions, because they are “too busy to mind the
business” (Beasley 1996; Core et al. 1999; Ferris et al. 2003; Fich and Shivdasani 2007). Similarly,
audit partners have limited attention and time, and thus conducting too many audits simultaneously
may negatively affect the quality of each audit.

3

Several previous studies examine the effect of client portfolio size on audit quality at the
individual partner level. They find that the number of clients per audit partner negatively affects
audit quality.3 Those studies fail to differentiate the two effects of client portfolio size: the busyness
effect and the loss of quasi-rents. To isolate the two effects, my research utilizes data on audit
partners from China, where disclosure of the identity of engagement audit partners is required. I
use different proxies for different effects. The 2010 reform in audit firm regulation in China
provides an opportunity to examine the effect of the wealth of an audit partner on audit quality.
The second determinant of audit firm size is the number of audit partners. Audit firms are
usually organized in the form of partnerships. Within a partnership, audit partners share their
profits and legal liabilities. Therefore, the problem of free riding arises. Although mutual
monitoring and a performance-based compensation plan mitigate the issue of free riding, these
mechanisms become less effective as the number of audit partners increases. In addition,
DeAngelo (1981) points out that large audit firms also have more moral hazard issues. This paper
attempts to examine the effect of the number of audit partners on audit quality.
The third measure I examine is whether the personal wealth of an audit partner affects the
quality of his/her work. The model developed by Dye (1993) regards the auditor’s wealth as
another measure of auditor size. Legal liability due to an audit failure imposes a threat to the wealth
of an audit partner, and this risk acts as an important incentive. Wealthy auditors, therefore, have
stronger incentives to provide high audit quality (e.g., Dye 1993, 1995; Chan and Pae 1998).

3

For bankrupt small and medium-sized Swedish clients, Sundgren and Svanström (2014) find that
partners’ client portfolio size is negatively related to the propensity to issue a going concern
opinion (GCO) before bankruptcy. For private Finnish clients, Karjalainen (2011) reports a
positive relationship between the absolute value of discretionary accruals and the portfolio size of
partners, particularly in the case of Big 4 audit firms and large clients.
4

To date, little is known about how audit partners’ wealth affects audit quality. This paper
attempts to fill this void. To do so, I analyze the effect of the wealth of an audit partner using the
framework from labor economics.4 In a typical labor economic framework, workers trade income
for leisure. Two major effects, the substitution effect and the income effect, affect the supply of
labor by a worker. The substitution effect refers to the effect that as wages increase, workers
provide more labor (leisure becomes more expensive); a wealthy audit partner, therefore, will work
more at the expense of leisure than those that are not wealthy. In the context of auditing, the
substitution effect refers to the fact that an audit partner increases his/her effort to decrease the
litigation risk as the opportunity cost of audit failure (i.e. the loss of personal wealth) increases.
The income effect, on the other hand, provides a counteracting effect. Income or wealth makes
leisure more affordable. As income (wealth) increases, partners are likely choose a higher level of
leisure (i.e., leisure is a normal good).
Prior to 2010, the majority of Chinese audit firms were organized in the form of limited
liability corporations, in which only the invested capital by an audit partner in the firm is lost, but
the wealth of the partner is protected from litigation risk in the event of audit failure. This setting
makes it possible to isolate the income effect. In 2010 Chinese regulators mandated the
transformation of all audit firms authorized to audit publicly-listed firms into limited liability
partnerships. In these partnerships, negligent audit partners’ personal wealth is exposed to
litigation risk if an audit failure occurs. In the period after 2010, therefore, audit quality has been
affected by both the income and the substitution effect. According to prior literature from labor
economics, when the substitution effect and the income effect are combined, the supply of labor

4

For a comprehensive review, see Killingsworth (1983). For a brief review, see Ehrenberg and
Smith (1991).
5

by an audit partner can take an inverted-U shape in relation to the wealth of the partner. As a result,
this study is able to examine the overall influence of both effects on audit quality.
The partner-level analysis of the relationship between portfolio size and audit quality is
motivated by the following important factors. First, the determinants of audit quality are a major
concern of both academics and practitioners. More recent studies (e.g., Reynolds and Francis 2000;
DeFond and Francis 2005; Chen et al. 2009) highlight the importance of research at the auditpartner level. One advantage of analysis at the individual partner level is its ability to provide a
better understanding of auditor behavior (Chen et al. 2010), since audit partners spend significant
time and effort in assessing client risk, reviewing critical assessments, and communicating with
clients (e.g., O’Keefe et al. 1994; Hackenbrack and Knechel 1997).
Second, several regulatory authorities around the world are considering introducing
regulations that require disclosure of the identity of engagement audit partners. For example, the
Public Company Accounting Oversight (PCAOB 2009) in the U.S. is considering such a
requirement, and a survey by the International Accounting and Auditing Standards Board (IAASB)
reveals that more than one hundred CPA associations in both developed and emerging markets
(e.g., Malaysia) are considering requiring audit partner signatures.5 Proponents suggest two major
benefits of mandatory partner signature: it can enhance the audit partner’s sense of accountability
to financial statement users; and disclosure of the name of the partner could be useful information
for investors and other parties. The ability to determine the work quality of an audit partner,
enabled by the disclosure, has clear implications for regulators around the world. Practitioners,

5

See also http://pcaobus.org/News/Events/documnets/10132010_SAGMeeting/OCA_standardssetting_agenda.pdf. The amended European Union’s (EU’s) 8th directive also requires the
disclosure of an engagement partner’s identity
6

however, are generally opposed to mandatory partner signatures (e.g., Deloitte 2008; Ernst &
Young 2009; KPMG 2009; PricewaterhouseCoopers 2009).
Third, the wealth of an audit partner is an important determinant of audit quality (Dye
1993). Prior studies mostly focus on the effect of legal liability on audit quality; research is lacking
on the direct effect of the wealth of a partner on audit quality. There is a large body of literature
from labor economics that examines factors that influence labor supply. My paper borrows theories
from labor economics to shed light on audit research.
Because of disclosure requirements in China, I am able to identify the Chinese audit
partners responsible for auditing individual companies. However, there is no direct data about
audit partner’s wealth in China. Therefore, I employ an indirect measure to determine that wealth,
using the cumulative sum of audit fees earned up to the current period. The Chinese legal
environment also provides a favorable setting in which to examine the effect of the wealth of audit
partners on audit quality. Before 2010, personal wealth accumulated from prior audit work
triggered only the income effect. By studying the income effect in that period, I can identify
whether or not leisure is a normal good for audit partners. Using a sample of Chinese publiclylisted firms for the period 2007-2009, I find a significant negative association between audit quality
and the wealth of an audit partner, which demonstrates the existence of the income effect and is
consistent with leisure being a normal good. My findings show that publicly-listed firms audited
by wealthier audit partners were more likely to be associated with larger abnormal accruals. In
2010, all audit firms authorized to audit publicly-listed firms were required to reorganize as limited
liability partnerships. In these partnerships, if an audit partner is found to be “negligent,” then s/he
is subject to unlimited liability in the case of an audit failure. Therefore in the period from 2010 to
2012 following the transformation, both the income effect and the substitution effect influence
7

audit partners’ choice of effort over leisure. By employing a quadratic form regression, I find that
the relation between wealth and audit quality takes an inverted-U shape. Within the initial range,
the substitution effect dominates the income effect, and wealthier audit partners are less likely to
manipulate earnings to avoid showing losses and less likely to show abnormal accruals. But after
a certain point, the income effect dominates the substitution effect.
To differentiate the two different types of effect of client portfolio size on audit quality, I
employ two proxies: the total assets of the client portfolio of the partner, which measures the
degree of busyness effect; and the total audit fees of the partner’s client portfolio, which serves as
an approximate measure of quasi-rents. A large client portfolio in terms of total assets requires
more work-time and effort. I find that audit partners with large total assets in their client portfolios
are more likely to have clients with abnormal accruals. Audit partners with higher audit fees are
more likely to issue qualified audit opinions and are less likely to have abnormal accruals and
small profits. This confirms the quasi-rents hypothesis.
This study contributes to the extant auditing literature in several ways. First, my study
contributes to the growing literature in auditing by providing evidence that audit quality is not
uniform across audit partners. My finding indicates that audit quality is affected by audit partners’
wealth and client portfolio size. Second, prior studies on the effect of client portfolio size normally
focus only on the busyness effect and do not distinguish the three effects on audit quality. This
study provides evidence for both the busyness hypothesis and the quasi-rents hypothesis. Third,
this is the first study that attempts to examine the effect of the personal wealth of an audit partner
on audit quality. I provide evidence that the wealth of an audit partner has an income effect on
audit quality, and that the relation between wealth and audit quality takes an inverted-U shape
when the substitution effect and the income effect coexist. The simple framework imported from
8

labor economics to examine the relation between wealth and audit quality also provides insights
into the effect of the legal environment on audit quality. A change in the law, such as from
unlimited liability to limited liability, or from joint several liabilities to proportional liability, has
an impact on the wealth of audit partners. Depending on the properties of leisure for audit partners
(i.e., whether it represents a normal good or an inferior good), each legal change may exert a
positive or a negative effect on audit quality.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 discusses the institutional
background of the Chinese auditing profession and the change in the regulation of audit firms in
China. Section 3 reviews the literature and develops several hypotheses based on stylized models.
Section 4 describes my research design and sample selection. Section 5 discusses empirical
findings. Section 6 presents additional tests. Section 7 provides the conclusions of the study.

9

Chapter 2: Institutional Backgrounds
This section provides a summary of the developments of the auditing profession in China
from several aspects: the legal environment facing the auditors, accounting standards, auditing
standards, and regulatory environment. The purpose of is this section is to provide the basic
institutional background for the following part of the paper.
2.1 Development of the Auditing Profession in China
Since 1949, when the People’s Republic of China was founded, China had followed the
Soviet model, centralizing all economic resource. By the mid-1950s, almost all private companies
were organized under state ownership and operated according to the orders and plans made by the
central government (Xiao et al. 2000). The budegting of all companies became part of the overall
state budgeting process, and all firms were monitored and supervised by government agencies,
such as the Ministry of Finance (MOF), the People’s Bank of China (the Central Bank), and the
tax bureaus of local governments and the central government. These types of control, however,
resulted in a lack of independence for auditors and were not truly effective (Xiao et al. 2000).
Without the demand for independent external audits, the CPA profession in China disappeared.
In 1979, an economic reform policy, the “opening up to the outside world,” was put into
place, creating a need for independent audits. China started to nurture a market-based economy by
allowing foreign direct investment, forming Sino-foreign joint ventures, decentralizing and
privatizing some state-owned enterprises, and establishing stock exchanges (DeFond et al. 2000;
Chan and Wu 2011). Emerging private companies and foreign investment created a demand for
the auditing of annual financial statements, and income tax returns, and for the verification of
capital contributions by independent auditors (Xiao et al. 2000). To satisfy this demand, the first
audit firm in the People’s Republic of China was founded in 1980 and was allowed to conduct
10

statutory audits (Xiao et al. 2000). In 1988, the Chinese government established the Chinese
Institute of Certified Public Accountants (CICPA) to administer the affairs of Chinese CPAs.
Initially, the majority of Chinese audit firms were founded under the sponsorship of
government agencies, government controlled not-for-profit organizations, and academic
institutions. Most of the senior partners in those audit firms were public officials who had
previously worked in the auditing or taxation departments of central or local governments with
certain accounting or auditing experience or knowledge, or taught accounting and audit in
universities faculties (DeFond et al. 2000). The affiliation with governments was an advantage for
those audit firms in the audit market because the companies owned by local governments gave
them preference. Affiliation of audit firms with public authorities, including universities, however,
damaged audit independence (Huang et al. 2010). Audit firms affiliated with the public authorities
were able to guard against the enforcement by the regulatory bodies, such as local departments of
finance or CICPA and the provincial branches, because the officials of these bodies were former
colleagues of the audit firms. In addition, former public officials or university faculty working in
the audit firms lacked modern auditing techniques and skills because all the knowledge and
experience they had were based on a planned economy and were inapplicable to a market-based
economy. To address this issue, a reform was initiated in 1997 to disaffiliate audit firms from their
sponsoring government bodies or universities. Meanwhile the Chinese Securities Regulatory
Commission (CSRC), the counterpart of the SEC in the US, set up strict market-entrance
requirements for Chinese CPAs who audit publicly-listed firms. These requirements are intended
to ensure proper disclosure and higher audit quality (Lin et al. 2009).6
6

An audit firm licensed to audit a publicly-listed firm has to satisfy the following requirements:
(1) a minimum of 80 CPAs; (2) invested capital of at least 3,000,000 RMB; (3) revenue of at least
16,000,000 RMB; and (4) a firm age of at least 3 years.
11

Big N audit firms also helped to develop the auditing profession in China. As more and
more multi-national corporations (MNCs) entered the Chinese market, they preferred the same
audit firms they used elsewhere in the world. The Big N audit firms started to provide service for
those MNCs. Initially these firms were not permitted to supply statutory audits, but around 1992,
began to form joint ventures with local audit firms designated by the MOF and won permission to
provide statutory audits. Since then, the Big N audit firms in China rapidly acquired more business.
Currently, the Big 4 audit firms occupy a large market share among the large Chinese state-owned
companies that are publicly listed in the Hong Kong or US stock exchange because they have the
competence to audit such large Chinese state-owned companies as PetroChina and China Mobile.
For examples, the Big 4 audit firms take up 95.4 % share of audit fees for SOEs that are publiclylisted in the Hong Kong Stock Exchange (Gillis 2014)
Overall, all efforts by Chinese regulators to make their regulations and institutions conform
with those of Western countries -- such as the mandating of similar audit standards, the admittance
of international companies into the Chinese market, and the training afforded to auditors by Big 4
and mid-sized audit firms have helped narrow the difference in auditing practices between China
and the Western countries.
2.2 Legal Liability of Auditors in China
Although China is considered to have a relatively weaker legal environment than the United
States and other Western countries (Chan, Lin, and Mo 2006), the litigation risk is not negligible
(Firth et al. 2012). According to Chinese laws on CPAs, auditors have direct legal liability to
investors for any “false and misleading statements or major omissions” in an audit report (Johnston
and Parker 2007). The first civil litigation against an audit firm in China was the case of Jiang vs.
PT Hong Guang and Chen Du Su Du CPA Firm in 1998. Chen, the auditor, was sued for issuing
12

a fraudulent report before PT Hong Guang went public. 7 As the legal environment in China
developed, more cases emerged in which investors sued companies and their auditors. A survey of
100 CPA firms carried out in 1999 by Li and He (1999) found that more than one-third of Audit
firms surveyed had been sued, and that the amount of money paid by the audit firms that lost or
settled the claims added up to many millions of RMB each. On January 2002, a much-anticipated
piece of legislation, the January 15 Notice, was issued; this law formally specifies the conditions
and procedures for investors to launch lawsuits against publicly-listed companies and their audit
firms (Supreme Court 2002). The notice further opened the door to investors’ claims in China
(Zhang 2002). Since then, a series of civil litigations against auditors by investors has been
initiated.8 These lawsuits have made auditors more prudent (Li and He 2000; Wen 2002). With
litigation exposure, audit partners in China are naturally concerned about the loss of their personal
wealth.
2.3 The Change in Legal Forms of Audit Firms in China
In 2010 the State Council and the Ministry of Finance issued “The Notice Regarding
Several Opinions on Accelerating the Development of the Chinese CPA Industry” (Guo Ban Fa
[2009] No. 56), and the Ministry of Finance and the General Administration for Industry and

7

The Su Du Audit Firm was accused of deliberately helping its client, PT Hong Guang, forging
transactions and overstating land value, and to hide the loss before IPO. Jiang, who purchased
1800 shares for after the IPO of PT Hong Guang and suffered a significant loss when the fraud
was discovered, was the first shareholder to launch the lawsuits against both the audit firm and the
management of Hong Guang (Zhang 2002). Although the lawsuit was rejected by the local court,
yet Jiang and other shareholders continued to bring lawsuits in other places. Despite of Jiang’s
failure to win the lawsuits the case gained great publicity, provoking other lawsuits and resulting
in the following legal changes.
8
A high-profile lawsuit case was the one against Da Qing Lian Yi, Mu Shi Hua, and Jia Bao Shi
Ye and their auditors. In July 2006, a local Chinese CPA firm in Hubei paid RMB5.4 million to
eighty-three investors of a listed company, Hubei Jianghu Ecology Co. Ltd., for their losses (Yu
2006).
13

Commerce jointly issued “The Regulation on Promoting Large and Medium Accounting Firms to
Transform to Limited Liability Partnerships” (Cai Kuai [2010] No. 12). Prior to these regulations,
audit firms in China could take one of two forms—that of a limited liability corporation, or of an
unlimited liability partnership. Audit partners in an unlimited liability partnership firm share
liabilities jointly and severally with other partners in the firm, whereas the liabilities of audit
partners in a limited liability corporation are limited to their personal contributions to the capital
of the audit firm. The regulations issued in 2010 required all audit firms licensed to audit publiclylisted companies to reorganize themselves as limited liability partnerships, in which negligent
partners have unlimited liability, while the liabilities of other audit partners are limited to their
personal contribution to the firm’s capital. Prior to the change, legal liabilities of audit partners
were limited to their contributions to the corporation, and so only the income effect played a role
in audit quality. In this setting, the income effect can easily be isolated. Although a sample of audit
firms organized as unlimited liability partnerships would be suited to examine the overall
consequence of income and substitution effects, such a sample would be very limited. My data
suggests that around 90% of audit firms are organized as limited liability corporations. However,
in the period following the regulatory change, all audit firms in China were transformed into
limited liability partnerships. This presents an opportunity to examine the overall consequences of
the substitution and income effects on audit partners.
2.4 Audit Oversight Frameworks
China has a tripartite audit oversight framework that consists of the Ministry of Finance
(MOF), the China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC), and the Chinese Institute of
Certified Public Accountants (CICPA). All of these bodies have regulatory responsibilities for the
CPA profession and the authority to inspect audit firms. The MOF has the power to inspect state14

owned companies and require audit firms to supply audit documentation for the inspected
companies. Similarly to the SEC in the US, the CSRC has the authority to stipulate accounting and
reporting practices for companies listed on the two stock exchanges: the Shenzhen Stock Exchange
and the Shanghai Stock Exchange.
All the audit firms qualified to serve the securities and futures market are subject to
inspection by the CSRC. The CSRC has the power to launch investigations based on a variety of
leads (Firth and Rui 2005). These leads come from tip-offs from investors, whistle-blowers, media
coverage, analyses of annual reports and other disclosures, referrals from the stock exchanges,
lawsuits, and police investigations. In addition, the CSRC continuously monitors the publiclylisted firms and conduct regular reviews and random investigations, which is similar to that for the
SEC in the U.S. (Pincus et al. 1988; Feroz et al. 1991). The CSRC regularly declare the results of
the investigation if any illegal activities related to securities and futures are found. An internal
warning will be issued by the CSRC to the investigated company or security firm if the violation
is minor, and no public disclosure will be made. The administrative punishments by the CSRC of
audit firms can take four main forms: public criticism, public condemnation, official warning, and
monetary fines. According to CSRC statistics, from 2001 to 2009, a total of 30 audit firms received
administrative punishments and 27 audit firms were fined an average amount of 229,000 RMB.
In the early years of the development of public accounting profession, two professional
organizations co-existed: the CICPA, which was sponsored by the MOF, and the Chines
Association of Certified Public Auditor (CACPA), which was sponsored by the State
Administration of Audit (SAA). Audit firms backed by the CICPA focused on firms with foreign
investments while audit firms backed by CACPA focused on domestic firms. This duality caused
a number of issues, such as repeated audits, a power struggle between the MOF and the SAA, and
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conflicting rules and regulations from the two government departments (Xiao et al. 2000).
Therefore, in 1993 the Chinese government decided to merge the CACPA into the CICPA, and
the MOF gained the power to supervise the CICPA
In 2004, the CICPA issued Rules on Accounting Firm Practice Quality Inspection. These
rules specified the procedures and requirement about the periodic inspections of audit firms. By
these rules, the national headquarter of the CICPA is responsible for inspecting audit firms with
licensce to audit publicly-listed firms every three years, and provincial branches of the CICPA are
responsible for the inspections of local audit firms every five years. According to the results of the
inspections, provincial branches of the CICPA can impose different forms of punishments on the
audit firms under their jurisdiction. For example, in the province of Guang Dong, there are four
types of punishments for the audit firms: complete self-review, mandatory training, public
criticism, public condemnation and the suspension of license. In 2011, the CICPA made a
comprehensive reform of the system, to strengthen the internal control system of an audit firm, to
improve the independence and competence of the inspection team, and to conform to the
international practices of inspections. From 2004 to 2013, the CICPA and local institutes inspected
accounting firms. In January 2011, the European Commission accepted the Chinese regulatory
system of audit profession as equivalent to the European system. In 2004, both the CICPA and the
local institutes sent 946 persons to inspect 1,438 audit firms. 89 audit firms and 211 individual
auditors received punishment, among which 16 audit firms and 21 CPAs received public
condemnation, 46 audit firms and 97 CPAs receive public criticism, and 27 audit firms and 93
CPAs received mandatory training.
Although the CICPA is a professional body, it lacks the independence of its Western
counterparts because professional associations in China, such as unions, are under heavy
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regulation of the government. The CICPA has governing statutes that must be endorsed and ratified
by the MOF.9 The Charter of the CICPA stipulates that it is a national social organization, under
the leadership of the MOF. In each province, local institutes of the CPA are under the supervision
and management of local finance 10 In addition, the secretary-general of the Communist Party
within the CICPA, who has a great influence on its operations, is appointed by the Organizational
Department of the Communist Party. Therefore, some of the policies and regulation issued by
CICPA are influenced by the political interests of the state. The political considerations and
bureaucratic interests of the central government impact the CICPA’s rule-making process, policy
orientation, and the enforcement (Lee 2014). For example, the CICPA issued the Ethical Standard
Rules in 2009, effective in 2010. These rules further emphasize that the CICIPA is under the
leadership of the MOF and the Communist Party (Lee 2014). In 2012, the CICPA issued a
regulation limiting the maximum percentage of foreign-qualified partners that a Chinese Big Four
affiliate could have as of August 2012 to 40%, and 20% by 2017. The regulation also requires that
each of the Big Four’s senior partners must eventually be all Chinese citizens. This is an example
of how the CICPA’s supervisory power can be influenced by political interests.
2.5 Accounting Standards and Auditing standards in China
The economic reform policy of “opening up to the outside world” in 1979 exposed the need
to transform accounting standards. The accounting system under the Soviet model, which was
designed for a planned economy, was not working in the market-based economy. To attract foreign
investment and facilitate the listing of Chinese domestic firms overseas, Chinese regulators

9

The CPA Law Art. 34; Also see The CPA Law Art 35, the CICPA undertaking to establish
professional standards and rules for auditors.
10
The CPA Law Art. 34
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gradually reformed the accounting standards in compliance with the International Accounting
Standards (Peng et al. 2010). In summary, there were four reforms:
a. The first reform was started in 1992 by the MOF who issued the Accounting Standard for
Business Enterprises and the Experimental Accounting System from Joint Stock Limited
Enterprises. This reform revolutionized the accounting system by introducing a marketoriented accounting model, and required all domestic companies without foreign
investment to follow the new accounting standards (Chen et al. 2002; Tang et al. 1995).
Some studies claim that the conceptual framework in the 1992 standards was modeled after
the international standards, whereas others disagree (Xiao and Pan 1997; Xiao et al. 1995).
b. The second reform was launched in 1998. The Accounting System for Joint Stock Limited
Enterprise was issued and replaced the 1992 standards, and ten specific Chinese
Accounting Standards (CAS) were issued.
c. The third reform occurred in 2001. The MOF issued the Accounting System for Business
Enterprises, which replaced the 1998 standards, and 16 CAS, which consisted of six newly
issued standards, five revised standards, and five original standards.
d. The fourth reform was the issuance of the Accounting Standards for Business Enterprises
(ASBEs) by the MOF on 15 February 2006. ASBEs consist of a new basic standard, which
replaced the 1992 basic standard, and 38 specific standards, which replaced the 2001
standards. The ASBEs included nearly all of the topics covered under the current
International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRSs) literature and became mandatory for
publicly-listed Chinese companies from 1 January 2007. Other Chinese companies were
also encouraged to follow the ASBEs. On November 8, 2005, a memorandum was released
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by the MOF and Sir David Tweedie of the International Accounting Standards Board,
announcing that Chinese standards had been substantially converged with IFRS except
some minor differences (Ding and Su, 2008).
As a result of the increase in the demand for independent audits after 1979, the CICPA
issued two sets of voluntary auditing standards in the early 1990s (Zhang 1993). These standards,
however, were incomplete and were not enforceable because they were issued only on a trial basis
(Xiao et al. 2000). In addition, several accounting frauds emerged in the 1990s and the issue of
unethical conduct and poor quality within some audit firms became a matter of public concern. In
response to the issues in the old auditing standards and the financial scandals, the 1993 CPA law
empowered the CICPA to develop auditing standards. The CICPA formed the China Independent
Auditing Standards Commission (CIASC) to develop new auditing standards in October 1994.Its
commision wad made up of members of the CICPA, and professionals from higher education,
research institutes, and audit firms (Xiao et al. 2000). The new auditing standards were similar to
the international auditing standard, and included detailed auditing procedures (DeFond et al. 2000).
The new standards were composed of a general standard, specific standards, practice
pronouncements, and auditing guidelines (Xiao et al. 2000). The general standard prescribes
overall requirements regarding the professional competence and practicing behavior of CPAs.
Specific standards deal with common auditing and reporting issues. Practice pronouncement
addresses auditing and reporting in special industries or special circumstances. Auditing guidelines
provide detailed operational procedures relevant to specific standards and practice
pronouncements. The general standard, specific standards, and practice pronouncements have
statutory authority over all CPAs conducting audits.

19

Although the standards issued around 1995 were similar to the International Standards on
Auditing (ISA), the CICPA decided to further converge the Chinese auditing standards with the
ISA. Efforts to achieve convergence with the ISA began in 2005. In December 2005 the Chinese
Auditing Standards Board (CASB) and the International Auditing and Assurance Standards Board
(IAASB) jointly announced that the CASB would continue to enhance the Chinese auditing
standards and increase the speed of convergence with the ISA.11 By 2010, The CASB has finished
amending Chinese Standards of Audit (CSAs) and reached an almost complete convergence with
the clarified ISAs. The amended CSAs were issued in early November 2010, and became effective
from January 1, 2011 on. The CASB converged almost all the CSAs with the ISAs, with the
exception of some revisions, which addressed issues unique to Chinese business environment. For
example, required verification of capital contributions is unique to Chinese companies. Several
major scandals in the early 1990s involved fictitious verification reports by accounting firms (Lin
and Chan, 2000). In the process of privatizing some SOEs through management buyouts, the
management of some state-owned companies chose to undervalue state assets in order to purchase
the SOEs at a cheap price. In some joint ventures between foreign firms and SOEs, the investment
of the foreign companies was overvalued. As a result, a special practice statement pronouncement
on capital verification was released to list the procedures of capital verification. Furthermore,
convergence with the International Code of Ethics for Professional Accountants was completed in
2009.12
2.6 Audit Licensing

11

Available at http://www.ifac.org/news-events/2010-11/chinese-auditing-standards-boardandinternational-auditing-and-assurancestanda
12
Available at http://www.ifac.org/sites/default/files/complianceassessment/part_3/201208ChinaCICPA.pdf
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Audit firms in China are required to be licensed by the MOF and the relevant provincial
governmental finance departments. The establishment of an audit firm has to be approved by the
MOF or the provincial finance bureaus. Audit firms that conduct audits of publicly-listed
companies must also gain a permit from the CSRC.
CPA licensing requirements consist of a nation-wide qualification examination and two
years of work experience. The first CPA examination was held in 1991. Over the first six years,
580,000 persons took part in CPA examinations, and only 24,000 obtained the CPA qualifications.
By 2012, there were around 4,000,000 applicants who took the exam, of which 166,000 obtained
the CPA qualification13. Before the CPA qualification examination was implemented, many CPAs
acquired their credentials through provincial finance bureaus based primarily on their seniority in
government positions. In addition, the way in which CPAs were evaluated by local finance
departments differed across provinces. These variations negatively impacted the quality of the
CPAs. In addition, many retired government officials who had worked in auditing departments
became CPAs, through sponsorship by various governmental agencies. In 2009, the CPA exam
was reformed. The new qualifying examination consists of two stages: a professional stage and a
comprehensive stage. An applicant currently has to pass the professional stage before taking the
comprehensive stage. Both examinations are held yearly. The professional stage consists of six
subjects: accounting, auditing, financial and cost management, economic law, taxation law, and
corporate strategies and risk management. The comprehensive stage examination focuses on how
applicants use their knowledge to solve specific issues in certain detailed circumstances. All the
exams must be completed within ten years. Passes in the six professional stage subjects are valid
for only five years; all subjects must be passed within that time frame or the candidate will be
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Available at http://news.xinhuanet.com/fortune/2013-01/21/c_114444812.htm
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obliged to retake some subject exams. After successfully completing all subject exams, candidates
receive the “Certificate for passing the professional stage examination.” The candidate is then
required to pass the comprehensive stage examination within the succeeding five years. Unlike the
requirement in most US states that a candidate has to obtain 150 credit hours in accounting,
taxation, or business administration, all Chinese citizens who have completed at least a two-year
college program at a recognized institution can apply to take the national CPA exam. Without the
specific accounting education requirement in China, the passing rate in each subject is very low;
the average passing rate in each subject is around 20%, while in the US the average passing rate
for the four required subjects is 50%.14
2.7 Mandatory Auditor Rotation
Lack of auditor independence in audit firms has been a serious concern for both academics
and practitioners. Although the disaffiliation of audit firms from the sponsoring government
organizations increased auditor independence, several large accounting frauds emerged around
2001, damaging the credibility of the auditing profession (Chen et al. 2010). Meanwhile, following
the collapse of Enron, some countries have imposed mandatory rotation of engagement audit
partners to increase audit independence. For instance, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act requires lead audit
partners in the US to be changed every five years. Similar regulations exist in Australia, Taiwan
and other jurisdictions (Firth et al. 2012). 15
Following this worldwide trend, Chinese regulators started to adopt the policy of
mandatory auditor rotations at both the firm level and the audit partner level in order to enhance
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See available at http://www.chinaacc.com/zhucekuaijishi/ksdt/yu1505217029.shtml
http://www.aicpa.org/BecomeACPA/CPAExam/PsychometricsandScoring/PassingRates/Downlo
adableDocuments/PassRates2015.pdf
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Singapore, Japan, the UK, France, Spain, the Netherlands, and Germany have also adopted
mandatory audit partner rotation
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the independence of audit work. In June 2003, the CSRC and MOF jointly issued a regulation that
mandates the rotation of the two signing engagement audit partners of publicly-listed companies
every five years, effective as of January 1, 2004. In addition, the regulation mandates a 2-year
cooling-off period, after which the rotated-off partner can rotate back to the previous client.
Further, in 2004 the State-owned Asset Supervision and Administration Commission of the State
Council (SASAC), which is responsible for managing large state-owned enterprises (SOEs)
controlled by the central government, issued a policy of rotation of audit firms for the SOEs
supervised by the SASAC. SOEs under the management of SASAC are now required to change
their audit firms every five years.
The policy of mandatory auditor rotation adopted by the Chinese regulator is based on the
argument that the familiarity between an auditor and a client formed through a long tenure may
threaten audit judgement and reduce the professional audit skepticism of the auditor. A new auditor
can bring a fresh perspective into the audit engagement (Healey and Kim 2003; Dopuch et al.
2001). A counter-argument makes the point that mandatory auditor rotation increases learning
costs because the new auditor has to acquire firm-specific knowledge, which had been already
gained by the incumbent auditor (Davis et al. 2009; Deis and Giroux 1992). Several studies
examine the effect of mandatory auditor rotation on the audit quality of Chinese publicly-listed
firms. For example, Firth et al. (2012) find that after mandatory audit partner rotation and voluntary
audit firm rotation, firms receive more frequent reports of MAO than firms without rotation.
However, the SOEs with mandatory rotation of audit firms and firms with voluntary audit partner
rotation did not experience significant increase in audit quality in terms of frequency of MAOs.
2.8 The Profession in China Today
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By 2014, there were approximately 99,045 practicing CPAs and 103,566 non-practicing
CPAs in China.16. The profession serves a nation with a population of over 1.3 billion people, and
a trade volume of more than $3.8 trillion.17 This equals one CPA for about every 13,000 people,
and one accounting firm for every 160,000 people. As of December 2014, there were 8,295 audit
firms, of which 40 was licensed to audit publicly-listed companies. 18 In contrast, in the United
States, there are more than 600,000 practicing CPAs and more than 40,000 audit firms, serving a
nation of more than 300 million people with a trade volume comparable to China in 2012.19 This
equals one CPA for every 500 people and one accounting firm for every 7,500 people. These
statistics indicate that there is a shortage of CPAs in China. The large number of non-practicing
CPAs in China who work in other industries indicates that the CPA profession also faces
competition for talent from other industries and big state-owned enterprises in a rapidly growing
Chinese economy.
2.9 Some Current Issues Facing the Chinese Auditing Profession
The first issue is the size of audit firms. The great majority of audit firms in China are small.
According to the CICPA, as of December 2010 there are 6,892 audit firms, of which 6,682 audit
firms are small firms.20 The dominance of small audit firms leads to severe fee competition and
low audit quality. In addition, small audit firms lack efficient internal control systems.
As discussed in the previous section on the Profession in China Today, the shortage of
CPAs in China poses a challenge for the development of the profession. In response to this
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Available at http://www.cicpa.org.cn/news/201302/t20130207_40210.html
Available at http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/economics/9860518/China-trade-nowbiggerthan-US.html
18
Available
http://www.csrc.gov.cn/pub/zjhpublic/G00306213/201403/W020140310620717659195.pdf
19
Available at http://www.duganlopatka.com/g400-cpa-firms
20
See available at http://www.shcpa.org.cn/journal/getJournalView.do?aid=680
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challenge, the CICPA has made some plans to improve both the quantity and quality of CPAs. For
example, the CICPA is currently funding 19 universities and colleges to set up majors related to
CPA qualifications (CICPA 2014).21 They argue that the requirements for continuing professional
education and for taking the CPA examinations are too low. All Chinese citizens with a full college
or two-year vocational college degree are allowed to take the examinations. This leads to the
qualifying of many candidates who lack a comprehensive education in accounting and business,
but are skilled at passing examinations.
Currently, disciplinary action against misconducts in the auditing profession mainly comes
from government regulators. Although the legal environment is continuously improving, there are
still some obstacles for investors who want to initiate class actions against audit firms. For example,
according to the January 15 notice, law suits launched by investors can be accepted only on the
condition that the company and its officers had been administratively sanctioned or criminally
convicted for the same misconduct. In addition, the contingency-fee payments to law firms are
banned in some provinces. Another important obstacle to initiating a class action is the lack of
competence among the judges, who are generally chosen from non-legal careers and do not have
formal legal education (Gu 2013).
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See available at http://www.cicpa.org.cn/BNIE/201502/W020150213322835632642.pdf
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Chapter 3: Theory and Hypothesis Development
3.1 Literature Review on Audit Partner and Audit Quality
By providing assurance about clients’ financial reports, independent auditors lend
credibility to financial statements and mitigate the agency conflicts between managers and outside
shareholders (Dopuch and Simunic 1982). There is a large body of literature on the positive role
played by high-quality auditors in financial reporting (e.g., Becker et al. 1998; Balsam et al. 2003).
Prior research on auditing generally analyzes the relation between big N auditors and audit
quality on the firm level by treating the whole accounting firm as a black box; these studies
investigate whether and how audit firm characteristics, such as size, tenure, and industry
specialization, affect audit quality (e.g., Simunic and Stein 1987; Francis and Wilson 1988; Becker,
DeFond et al. 1998; Francis and Krishnan 1999). Prior studies at the firm level implicitly share the
underlying assumption that audit firms are able to maintain uniform audit quality across audit
partners through standardized firm-wide policies and internal control systems (e.g., through
training materials, industry-specific databases, internal benchmarks for best practices, automatic
IT systems, and internal consultative practices). Some tasks and controls can be made at the firm
level or office level, such as acceptance and discontinuation of clients, training new staff, and
installing IT systems. These studies neglect to take into an account that many tasks are clientspecific and involve considerable judgment and decision-making by audit partners – such as
evaluation of a client’s internal control, audit planning, substantive evidence collection, and
interpretation of audit evidence. It is a more reasonable approach, therefore, to allow each audit
partner to stand as a unit of analysis than to treat all audit work and partners as homogeneous.
Partner-level studies on audit quality are relatively limited, however, because the identity of
engagement audit partners is not available in many countries.
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There are a few recent partner-level studies that rely on data from China, Taiwan, Sweden,
and Australia, where the names of audit partners must be disclosed in audit reports. Gul et al. (2013)
suggest that the identity of audit partners is likely to have a bearing on audit quality. Zerni (2012)
uses audit-partner-signature data from Sweden and finds that the highest audit fees are earned by
engagement partners who are industry specialists: i.e., those who have achieved a dominant market
share in an industry.
Another group of studies examines the effects of audit partner tenure. Chen et al. (2008)
find that audit partner-client tenure is negatively related to unsigned abnormal accruals, and that
in the Taiwanese market the effect of auditor tenure is more significant at the partner level than at
the firm level. These findings suggest that audit partner-client tenure increases the partner’s
specific knowledge about the client, leading to higher audit quality. Other studies, however,
suggest that longer audit tenure is associated with lower audit quality. For example, Bedard and
Johnstone (2010), using proprietary data from a large US audit firm, find that planned engagement
effort increases in the first year of partner-client tenure following partner rotation. Similarly, using
Australian data, Carey and Simnett (2006) show that the probability of issuing a going concern
opinion decreases as audit partner tenure increases. However, this relation is not observed in a
reduced sample of financially distressed firms, about which auditors are most likely to issue a
going concern opinion. Moreover, Carey and Simnett (2006) fail to find any link between long
audit tenure and abnormal accruals. In summary, the evidence linking long audit tenure with audit
quality is somewhat mixed.
Some studies look at the effect of industry expertise at the audit partner level. Chin and Chi
(2009) use a sample of listed firms in Taiwan to investigate the association between auditor
industry expertise and restatement likelihood at both the partner level and the audit firm level.
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Their evidence suggests that differences in restatement likelihood due to industry expertise are
mainly attributable to partner-level experts rather than to other firm-level experts.
In a related study, Blay et al. (2012) investigate audit quality changes after the
implementation of mandatory audit partner signature in the United Kingdom and the Netherlands.
They do not find a substantial change in audit quality after the implementation of the new
requirement. As discussed above, proponents of mandatory signature suggest two possible benefits:
such a requirement can increase an audit partner’s accountability, and the disclosure could be
useful information for financial information users (See ACAP Report, October 2008, at VII: 19).22
The historical record of audits can also be used to infer the quality of an audit partner. For example,
Aobdia et al. (2014) find that firms audited by audit partners of high quality have larger earnings
response coefficients, smaller IPO underpricing, and better debt contract terms. Given that Blay et
al. (2012) fail to provide support for the idea that disclosure would increase audit quality in the
U.K. and the Netherlands, the issue of whether audit partner signature is useful is still an open
empirical question. The question might be even more difficult to answer in a developing country
like China.
A study by Gul et al. (2014) examines some personal characteristics of Chinese audit
partners, such as educational background, Big N audit firm experience, rank in the audit firm, and
political affiliation. They find that there is a significant variation in audit quality across individual
audit partners within both large audit firms and small audit firms, and that some of the sociodemographic characteristics account for the difference in audit quality across partners. These
findings highlight the importance of examining quality at the audit partner level.
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See http://www.treas.gov/offices/domestic-finance/acap/docs/final-report.pdf.
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A few studies examine the effect of audit partners’ client portfolio size on audit quality.
Sundgren and Svanstrom (2014) find that the number of public clients in a portfolio is negatively
related to the propensity to issue a going-concern opinion before bankruptcy. Similarly,
Karjalainen (2011) finds that in Finland the number of private clients of an audit partner has a
positive relationship with the absolute value of discretionary accruals. One issue with the prior
studies is that they focus only on the detrimental effect of the portfolio size of audit partners; audit
partners with more clients are too busy to expend enough effort and attention on each. My study
attempts to discuss all the relevant benefits and costs of portfolio size and to differentiate those
costs and benefits.
Starting from the seminal work of Siminuc (1980), litigation risk has been seen as another
major factor incentivizing auditors to produce high-quality audit work. In Simunic’s (1980) model,
which describes the relationship between audit quality and legal liability, the audit fee is modeled
as a function of expected losses from litigation. Furthermore, Dye (1993) develops his argument
by pointing out that larger auditors have “deeper pockets” (i.e., more at-risk wealth) and thus face
a larger loss from litigation in the case of audit failure. Dye (1993), therefore, predicts that larger
auditors with more wealth will provide higher quality audits. Prior literature relying on the “deep
pockets” hypothesis examines changes in litigation environment and provides mixed conclusions.
For example, Lee and Mande (2003), Francis and Krishnan (2003), Choi et al. (2004), and Geiger
et al. (2006) investigate the consequences of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act
(PSLRA1995), which reduced the liability threat for audit firms in the US. Their findings are
equivocal. A limitation of these studies is that they lack a control sample of audit firms that did
not experience a reduction in the liability threat following the enactment of the PSLRA.
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Some studies examine differences in the legal organization of audit firms. For example,
Muzetko et al. (2004) and Lennox and Li (2012) investigate the consequences of allowing audit
firms to become limited liability partnerships. Muzetko et al. (2004) find that IPO underpricing
increases following audit firms’ shift to LLP status. However, Lennox and Li (2012) find no
evidence that audit firms supply lower audit quality. Another related study by Firth et al. (2012)
uses a sample of Chinese audits in the period from 2000 to 2004, when audit firms were allowed
to choose between limited liability corporation status and unlimited liability partnership, and find
that unlimited liability partnerships were more likely than limited liability corporations to issue
modified audit opinions. All prior studies on litigation provide only indirect evidence about the
“deep pocket” hypothesis. Due to limitations on data about auditor’s wealth, empirical studies on
the effect of partners’ wealth on audit quality is lacking. My study advances this line of literature.
3.2 Audit Partner’s Wealth
Wealth acts as a bond to ensure high-quality audits in high-risk litigation settings, as
investors can recoup their losses from the auditor in the event of an audit failure (Lennox and Li
2012; Dye 1993). The extant research examines differences in liability threat to partners’ wealth
(Lennox and Li 2012; Firth et al. 2012; Geiger et al. 2006; Choi et al. 2004). Geiger et al. (2006)
found that reductions in audit litigation resulting from the PSLRA had a major impact on the
decision-making of Big 6 firms. A countervailing effect on audit quality arises when auditors are
wealthier. The literature from labor economics argues that the labor supply is jointly determined
by the substitution effect and the income effect. According to labor economics, as the wage rate
increases, leisure becomes more costly and workers supply more labor; this is the substitution
effect. The income effect posits that as income increases a worker can afford to take more leisure.
In the context of auditing, an audit partner can increase detection risk and lower audit risk by
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working longer hours, careful planning, and more comprehensive substantive tests. The high
earnings of an audit partner results largely from the decrease in liability risk. To demonstrate the
income effect and the substitution effect, following the framework of Dye (1995), I develop a
simple stylized model.
3.2.1 The Setup of the Model
Audit technology is characterized by the probability of the engagement auditor’s attestation
report being correct, conditional on the company’s real financial condition, and the partner’s effort
input. There is an inherent risk associated with a firm’s financial position. Two types of firms exist:
firms with good earnings (G) and firms with bad earnings (B). The fraction of firms with bad
earnings in the population is r, where P (Type=Bad) = r. Firms with good earnings report truthfully.
Firms with bad earnings are assumed to misreport that they have good earnings. e denotes the
probability of detection of misreporting by the firm’s auditor, where P(Report=B / Type=B,e)=e.
It also represents the effort expended by the individual auditor.
According to the framework used in labor economics, an audit partner has the following
problem to be solved:
max e u(c,l)
s.t.

c=w-r (1-e)min{L,w}
e+l=T,

where c represents the consumption level, l denotes leisure, w denote the total wealth an audit
partner has, L stands for the legal liability held by an audit partner and T denotes the total available
time an audit partner has.
Combining the constraints by substituting T-l for e, I have:
w-r(1-T)min{L,w}=c+rmin{L,w}l,
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where the left hand side shows the total available resources for consumption.
If L > w, then the constraint is w(1-(1-T)r)=c+wrl. The expression 𝑤𝑟 can be considered
as the price of leisure. Thus, wealth, w, has two effects on the audit effort level e. The substitution
effect is the same as the bonding effect discussed in the previous literature (Simunic 1980; Dye
1993, 1995). Dye (1993) models an audit as providing financial statement users with a claim on
the auditor in the event of audit failure. The second effect is the income effect. If leisure is assumed
to be a normal good, the wealthier audit partners enjoy more leisure time by decreasing audit effort.
In the range where L > w, the relation between audit quality and wealth depends on the strength of
the income effect and substitution effect.
If L<w, then the constraint is w-r(1-T)L=c+Lrl. In this case, only the income effect remains.
More wealth in this situation leads to lower audit quality.
Whether the income effect and substitution effect both exist among audit partners is not
only empirically and theoretically interesting, but also has important policy implications. Prior
empirical studies examine the effect of legal liability on audit quality. Similarly, the change in
legal liability affects audit quality through the income effect and the substitution effect. To
illustrate this point, I define that the probability of winning a lawsuit against an audit partner
conditional on audit failure is k, which measures the legal environment. The budget constraint
facing an audit partner becomes w(1-r(1-T)k)=c+wrkl. The increase in expected legal liability for
an audit partner, k, has a positive impact on audit quality because of the substitution effect that
rkw, which is the price or opportunity cost of leisure, increases in legal liability. If leisure is a
normal good for an audit partner, the increase in legal liability for an audit partner, k, also has a
positive impact on audit quality. Due to the income effect, total expected wealth available for
consumption, w(1-r(1-T)k) decreases as k increases, and audit partners can afford less leisure and
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supply more labor. If, on the contrary, leisure is an inferior good, the increase in legal liability for
an audit partner, k, would have a negative impact on audit quality. So it is important to identify
whether or not leisure is a normal good when a change in legal liability rules is under consideration.
3.2.2 Hypothesis Development
In the 2010 Reform Act (Cai Kuai [2010] No. 12) all audit firms with the license to audit
publicly-listed firms in China were mandated to reorganize as limited liability partnerships. Prior
to the reform, the personal wealth of negligent audit partners was largely protected by limited
liability; only the capital invested in the firm (referred to as “inside” wealth) was at risk. Therefore
the budget constraint for an audit partner is as follows: wpersonal+winside×(1-(1-T)r)=c+ winside ×rl
where winside represents the capital invested in the firm by the partner and wpersonal represents the
personal wealth of an audit partner. Only winside is subject to litigation risk while wpersonal is
protected from legal liability. I use the sample from Chinese audit firms before the legal reform to
identify the income effect of wealth on audit quality. A large body of research from labor
economics suggests that leisure is a normal good and wealth has a positive effect on leisure, thus
leading to a decrease in audit quality (Kaplan 1985; Imbens et al. 2001; Kreinin 1961; Landsberger
1963; Holz-Eakin et al. 1993). 23 My first hypothesis is:
Hypothesis 1a: Audit quality has a negative relation with wealth prior to the reform.
After the reform, an audit partner’s personal wealth became exposed to litigation risk, and
both the income effect and the substitution effect are present. Therefore, the shape of supply of
audit effort by an audit partner depends on the strength of two forces, the income effect and the

23

Studies show that when individuals receive unexpected income, such as winning the lottery
(Kaplan 1985; Imbens et al 2001), one-time war reparations paid to Israeli citizens by the German
government (Kreinin 1961; Landsberger 1963), or inheritance (Holz-Eakin et al. 1993), they
increase consumption and leisure, confirming that consumption and leisure are normal goods.
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substitution effect. Prior literature in labor economics generally assumes that the shape of the
supply curve of labor is backward-bending: in the lower wage range, in which the substitution
effect dominates the income effect, the supply of labor has a positive slope while after a certain
point the supply of labor bends backward (Gilbert and Pfouts 1958; Hanoch 1965; Barzel and
McDonald 1973). Therefore, it is hypothesized that:
Hypothesis 1b: Audit quality has an inverted-U-shaped relation with audit partners’ wealth
after the reform in 2010 Chinese legal reform.
3.3 The Client Portfolio Size of an Audit Partner
3.3.1 Hypothesis Development
The relationship between auditor size and audit quality is a crucial question for both
practitioners and academics. Prior research generally treats the audit firm as a black box and
examines the effect of size on quality at the level of the firm. In this section, I demonstrate two
kinds of effects that an audit partner’s portfolio size exerts on audit quality.
A large client portfolio size has a negative effect on audit quality due to the limited attention
and time of the partner (Kahneman 1973; Simon 1978, 2013). The busyness effect suggests that
directors holding multiple board seats are “too busy to mind the business” (Beasley 1996; Core et
al. 1999; Ferris et al. 2003; Fich and Shivdasani 2007). The busyness effect also applies to audit
partners because their time and effort are finite. Although a partner can increase the size of his
audit team and delegate tasks to subordinate staff, these steps may not solve the limited attention
problem because supervising and coordinating the activities of subordinates also call for additional
attention.
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Clients in an audit partner’s portfolio differ in terms of size. Large clients are generally
complex and demand more effort from an audit partner. So an audit partner with a larger clientele
is likely to be busier than an audit partner with a smaller clientele. The first hypothesis is as follows:
Hypothesis 2a: Ceteris paribus, audit partners with larger client portfolios are associated
with lower audit quality (business effect)
The study by Klein and Leffler (1981) is the first to provide an economic rationale for the
influence of size on quality. They point out that firms with larger output can earn a price premium
and, in a setting of repeat-purchase firms with larger output, have an incentive to provide high
quality for fear of losing the price premium. DeAngelo (1981) extends Klein and Leffler (1981)’s
argument by studying the importance of audit quality for auditors. She argues that the auditors
make more quasi-rents by providing higher-quality audits. Larger auditors will lose more quasirents if an audit failure occurs. The incentive for an auditor in DeAngelo (1981) is to protect future
quasi-rents from clients.
Hypothesis 2b: Ceteris paribus, audit partners with more quasi-rents exhibit higher audit
quality.
3.4 Audit Partnership
Audit firms in China are mostly organized as partnerships, composed of a group of partners
who share profits and legal liability. When an individual partners’ client portfolio size is held
constant, the number of audit partners becomes the determinant of audit firm size. Prior research
suggests that audit partners are usually compensated through a system of profit-sharing (Burrows
and Black 1998, Greenwood et al. 1990). A survey in the late 1980s and early 1990s by Trompeter
(1988, 1994) found that the compensation plans of the-then Big 8 (6) firms could be classified into
“small pool” and “large pool” plans, according to the importance of “local office profitability” in
35

determining an individual partner’s compensation. Audit firms using “large pool” plans base
partner compensation on firm-wide profitability, while “small pool” plans use local-office-wide
profitability. Profit-sharing among audit partners gives rise to the agency problem of free riding
(Huddart and Liang 2005; Holmstrom 1982). As a consequence, a large audit firm creates a larger
pool, thereby causing more severe moral hazard issues. However, compensation plans employed
by audit firms are not always equal-sharing, rather often a mixture of equal-sharing and
performance-based sharing, in which each partner is paid based on his/her performance.
Greenwood et al. (1990) interviewed partners from four of the Big 8 Canadian accounting firms
and found that partners generally received a base salary plus an additional bonus based on
performance. “Experience, length of employment with a firm, revenue-generating success,
responsibilities in the firm, and type of clients” is the measures used. In a related study, Burrows
and Black (1998) interviewed Australian Big 6 audit partners from Melbourne and also observed
considerable variation in profit-sharing among individual partners. Similarly, a survey by Li (2012)
shows that compensation for audit partners in most of the audit firms in China consists of both a
fixed salary and a performance-based bonus.
To some extent, incentive-based compensation contracts alleviate the moral hazard
problem within a partnership. However, the performance of an individual auditor is a joint output
of his/her effort and that other professional. As their size increases, audit firms become more
formalized, and various departments -- such as personnel, consulting, and tax and so on -- are
created. Specialization across partners increases when specific audit partners are assigned to head
different departments (Arnett and Danos 1980). In addition, the degree of hierarchy increases with
expansion. The sensitivity of performance measures to an partner’s effort decreases, as
performance measures by the partners come also to reflect the effort of other professionals, inviting
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an undersupply of effort (Alchian and Demsetz 1972). Another issue associated with performancebased compensation plans is the excessive weight placed on easily measurable factors, such as the
portfolio size, at the expense of other important but difficult-to-measure contributions made by a
partner, including risk management, mentoring, and recruiting. Furthermore, performance-based
plans are based mainly on short-term performance because longer-term results are difficult to
define and measure.
Peer monitoring is another way to combat the agency problem in a partnership. Mutual
monitoring among audit partners promotes audit efficiency and uniformity across engagements,
reducing the partners’ exposure to litigation, and helping to build reputational capital (Dirsmith
and Haskins 1991, Greenwood and Empson 2003). As the number of partners increases, however,
peer monitoring becomes less effective (Kandel and Lazear 1992). As the size of partnership and
its heterogeneity in terms of location and other attributes increases, mutual monitoring becomes
more difficult and less accurate. In addition, since the benefit of monitoring is shared by all the
partners, the incentive to monitor is decreased. The hypothesis is as follows:
Hypothesis 3a: Ceteris paribus, the number of audit partners is negatively related to audit
quality in an audit firm.
While large audit firms suffer from more agency issues, they benefit from economies of
scale. Dopuch and Simunic (1980) contend that larger audit firms with a larger client base can
support more areas of specialized knowledge (e.g., in-depth knowledge of the client’s industry,
and better understanding of different tax laws and accounting standards). Such specialization leads
to superior audit quality. In addition, other fixed investments, such as information technology,
office rent, and legal consulting costs, can be spread among a large client base, making them
cheaper. DeAngelo (1981) argues that larger audit firms have a reduced incentive to ‘‘cheat’’ to
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retain any individual client because auditors lose quasi-rents from all other clients when lower
audit quality is detected and disclosed. The hypothesis is as follows:
Hypothesis 3b: ceteris paribus, an audit firm with a larger client base has higher audit
quality.
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Chapter 4: Research Design and Sample Selection
4.1 Measurement of Audit Quality
The important audit outcomes are audit reports and audited financial statements.
Accordingly, I measure audit quality by focusing on auditors’ reporting decisions and the financial
statement quality of client firms (Francis 2004). Following Lennox (2005), I use three proxies for
audit quality: first, auditor propensity to issue modified audit opinions (MAO); second,
discretionary accruals; and third, the presence of small profits.
The first proxy is the propensity to issue MAO. Audit opinions in China include unqualified
opinions, unqualified opinions with explanatory notes, qualified, disclaimed, and adverse opinions.
Chinese auditing standards (Ministry of Finance 1995) require auditors to issue qualified
(disclaimed or adverse) opinions for: (1) GAAP violations; (2) scope limitations; and (3)
inconsistencies in applying accounting standards. Moreover, auditing standards allow auditors to
use explanatory notes to indicate significant events, such as pending lawsuits that may materially
affect future performance. Following the prior China-related research (e.g., DeFond et al. 2000,
Gul et al. 2013), I define modified opinions to include unqualified opinions with explanatory notes,
qualified, and disclaimed, and adverse opinions.
As the second proxy, I use discretionary accruals to measure audit quality. Following
previous studies (e.g., Becker et al. 1998, Francis and Krishnan 1999, Menon and Williams 2004),
I run the following modified version of the Dechow and Dichev (2002) model suggested by
McNicols (2002) to estimate abnormal accruals. The model expresses working capital accruals as
a function of lagged, current, and future operating cash flows, as well as sales growth and the level
of fixed assets, as follows:
∆WCt=α+β1CFOt-1+β2CFOt+β3CFOt+1+β4∆Salest+β5 PPEt+ε,
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where ΔWCt is working capital accruals in year t, computed as operating net income plus
depreciation, amortization, and financial expenses, minus operating cash flows. CFOt-1, CFOt, and
CFOt+1 are operating cash flows in year t-1, t, and t+1, respectively. ΔSalest is sales growth from
t-1 to t and PPEt is the gross value of fixed assets. All of these variables are scaled by the average
of the beginning and ending total assets in year t to reduce heteroscedasticity. The abnormal
accruals are defined as the absolute value of regression residuals.
The third proxy is the presence of a small profit. The presence of a small profit is interpreted
as evidence of income-increasing earnings management (Burgstahler and Dichev 1997; Francis
and Wang 2008; Francis and Yu 2009; Jorgensen et al. 2012). For regulatory reasons, Chinese
companies have particularly strong incentives to inflate earnings to report a small profit. In China,
a company must be profitable for three consecutive years to qualify for the issuance of a seasoned
equity offering. Moreover, a company that incurs losses for two consecutive years will be subject
to special treatment -- e.g., a daily price change limit of five percent -- and will risk being delisted
from the stock exchange if it cannot generate a profit in the third year. Jiang and Wang (2008)
show that this regulatory requirement induces Chinese companies to inflate earnings to report
small profits. Chen et al. (2001) demonstrate that Chinese companies with small profits are more
likely to receive MAOs, suggesting that small profits are likely to result from earnings management.
I define a company as having a small profit (SP) if its ROA is between zero and one percent. Audit
quality decreases with the presence of SP in audited financial reports.
I control for several factors that could affect audit opinion and earnings quality. Dechow
et al. (2010) suggest that financial characteristics, such as operating performance, debt, and growth,
affect earnings quality. Moreover, previous studies find that in China earnings management is
affected by local government ownership (Wang et al. 2008; Chan et al. 2006). I therefore include
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a variable to indicate that a client is controlled by a local government or the central government
(State) and control for the following client characteristics: return on assets (ROA), the presence of
loss (Loss), complexity in terms of ratio of inventory and receivables to total assets (Complexity),
the log value of total assets (Size), and the leverage ratio (Leverage). Dechow et al. (2010) also
suggest that earnings quality is affected by time-varying auditor characteristics. I control for audit
partner industry specialization (Expertise), audit partner tenure (APTenure), audit firm tenure
(AFTenure), and audit partner experience (Experience).
4.2 Measurement of Auditor Size
This paper examines auditor size from three perspectives: client portfolio size, the number
of audit partners, and the wealth of audit partners. Previous studies on the characteristics of audit
partners mainly use the number of clients per partner or the total assets of client portfolios to
measure the size of a partner’s client base (Sundgren and Svanström 2014; Karjalainen 2011).
Without differentiating the two different effects of client-base size discussed above, the prior
research captures only the overall outcome of portfolio size. First of all, DeAngelo argues that
audit partners with more clients have more quasi-rents to lose, but generally clients within an audit
partners’ portfolio differ in terms of quasi-rents. The number of clients per audit partner, therefore,
may not accurately measure the total quasi-rents of an audit partner. Client-specific quasi-rents
arise because audit technology is characterized by significant start-up costs, and an incumbent
audit partner has some bargaining power (DeAngelo 1981) and can charge higher audit fees.
Therefore, compared with other size measures, audit fee is a better proxy for quasi-rents (e.g.,
Craswell et al. 2002; Hunt and Lulseged 2007). A large client also demands more time effort. I use
the total assets of the client portfolio of an audit partner as a proxy for busyness. The other
important measure of auditor size is the total personal wealth of an audit partner. Due to the
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limitations of the data, I can only measure an audit partner’s wealth in an indirect manner.
According to a survey by Li (2012), audit fees usually represent the major income of an audit
partner. The total audit fees an audit partner earns can, therefore, be used as a proxy for personal
wealth.
4.3 Regression Model
The sample period is divided into two periods: from 2007 to 2009, and from 2010 to 2012.
Audit firms were transformed into limited liability partnerships in 2010. In the period from 2007
to 2009, I examine the income effect of wealth on audit quality by employing the following
regression model:
AQijt=α+β1Wealthijt+β2Sclientijt+β3Qclientijt+β4Sfirmijt+β5control variablesijt+ ϵijt
where Wealthijt represents the total audit fees an audit partner has earned up to the current period;
Sclientijt is total assets of the client portfolio of an audit partner; Qclientijt represents total audit
fees from the client portfolio of an audit partner; and Sfirmijt is the total assets of the client portfolio
of an audit firm.
In the period from 2010 to 2012, when audit firms in China were required to be reorganized
as limited liability partnerships and the wealth of partners became exposed to litigation risk, I
employ a quadratic form to estimate the non-linear relation between audit partners’ wealth and
audit quality.
AQijt=α+β1Wealthijt+ β2Wealth_Squaredijt +β3Sclientijt+β4Qclientijt+β5Sfirmijt+β6control
variablesijt+ ϵijt
To test the relation between the number of audit partners in an audit firm and audit quality,
I focus on the year 2012 because data on the number of audit partners was only available for the
most recent year.
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AQijt=α+β1Wealthijt+ β2Wealth_Squaredijt +β3Sclientijt+β4Qclientijt+ β5Npartnersijt
β6Sfirmijt+β7control variablesijt+ ϵijt ,
where Npartnersijt is the variable of interest.
4.4 Sample Selection
The sample period I use is from 2007 to 2012. I designate 2007 to 2009 as the pre-2010
period, and 2010 to 2012 as the post-2010 period. I construct my sample with all the available
audit partners’ observations from the Database of China Stock Market & Accounting Research
(CSMAR). I obtain 7,382 observations for the period from 2007 to 2009, and 11,894 observations
for the period from 2010 to 2012. The detailed sample selection process is presented in Table 1,
Panel A. I further winsorize the sample at the 1% and 99% levels for all the continuous control
variables in the regression model. I gather data on the number of audit partners using the inquiry
system

compiled

by

the

Chinese

Institute

of

Certified

Public

Accountants

at

http://cmis.cicpa.org.cn. Table 1, Panels B and C, shows the distribution of the samples across
different years. I find the number of observations increases year by year, consistent with the
expansion of the Chinese stock market in recent years.
4.5 Descriptive Statistics
Table 2 presents descriptive statistics of the sample. Panel A, B, and C show the personal
wealth of the partners, total assets of the client portfolio of an audit partner and all audit fees earned
from the client portfolio by an audit partner. The average wealth and average total audit fees per
partner remains stable from 2007 to 2012.
Panel D shows the descriptive statistics for all other variables. The average SP (small profit)
is 0.11, suggesting that 11 percent of the observations report small earnings between 0 and 1%.
The average MAO is 0.06, consistent with prior findings that Chinese auditors tend to issue
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qualified audit opinions infrequently (Chen et al. 2010). To confirm the reliability of the data, I
compare my data with that of other concurrent studies. For example, compared with Chen et al.
(2010), who use data from 1995 to 2004, my sample is expected to be slightly larger, since the
Chinese economy has grown during the last decade. Consistent with this, the mean of size in my
sample is 21.64, which is larger than the mean size of 20.89 in Chen et al. (2010). The mean ROA
in my sample is 0.04, which is higher than the mean of 0.029 in Chen et al. (2010). The mean of
leverage in my sample is 0.48, which is close to 0.492 in Chen et al. (2010).
Table 3 provides the results of bivariate tests. I calculate the mean values of MAO, AbAcc,
and SP for partners with different levels of wealth for each quartile. Panel A shows the distribution
of MAO, discretionary accruals, and SP for partners in the period from 2007 to 2009 prior to the
legal change. Table 3 Panel A shows that audit partners in the sub-sample with more wealth are
associated with larger discretionary accruals, less frequent MAO, and more frequent SP, consistent
with the income effect. Panel B shows the results for partners for the period from 2010 to 2012,
demonstrating that audit partners with wealth in the first and fourth quartiles have larger
discretionary accrual than audit partners with wealth in the second and third quartiles. This
provides some evidence for the income effect and the substitution effect. SP and MAO, however,
do not follow the pattern suggested by the model.
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Chapter 5: Empirical Results
5.1 Modified Audit Opinion
Table 5 uses the issuance of modified audit opinion as a measure of audit quality. In both
periods, there is a significant positive association between total fees for an audit partner and the
probability of issuing an MOA. This indicates that as total fees, which proxies for total quasi-rents,
of an audit partner increases, the quality of audits increases as well. This is consistent with the
quasi-rent hypothesis. Other variables of interest are, however, not significant. The coefficients on
other control variables are also generally consistent with prior studies.
5.2 Abnormal Accruals
Table 6 uses the absolute value of abnormal accrual as an inverse measure of audit quality.
The first column shows the regression results for the pre-2010 period. In this column, wealth is
positive and significant, indicating that wealthier audit partners exhibit lower audit quality. This
result confirms that wealth has an adverse income effect on audit partner’s effort. In the post-2010
period, in which audit partners have unlimited liability, both coefficients on wealth and the squared
wealth are significant, suggesting that wealth has an inverted-U shape relation with audit quality.
The coefficient on the total assets of the client portfolio of an audit partner has a positive and
significant sign. This is consistent with the busyness effect. The association between total fees for
a partner and abnormal accrual is negative and significant. This is consistent with the hypothesis
that audit partners with more quasi-rents have greater incentives to provide better audit quality.
The coefficient on the size of the client portfolio of an audit firm is negative and significant in the
post-2010 period. This provides evidence for economies of scale.
5.3 Small Profits
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Table 7 uses the presence of small profits as a measure of audit quality. In the post-2010
period, there is a significant inverted-U shape association between wealth and audit quality. The
coefficient on total assets of a client portfolio is significant in the period after the reform. This is
also consistent with the busyness hypothesis. The coefficient on total fees for an audit partner is
negative and significant in the period before the reform.
5.4 Number of Audit Partners.
Table 8 uses data from 2012, in which year information about the number of audit partners
in each audit firm is obtainable. The coefficients on the number of audit partners from the
regressions of abnormal accruals and small profits are positive and significant. This is consistent
with the free riding hypothesis.
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Chapter 6: Additional Tests
6.1 Identification of Chief Audit Partners
Chinese auditing standards require that two or three audit partners sign an audit report. In
my sample, most audit reports are signed by two audit partners. Chinese auditing standards require
one of the two signing partners in an audit engagement to be one of the chief partners of an audit
office. As Gul et al. (2012) point out, in practice the chief audit partners sign almost every audit
report of the audit office to satisfy this requirement, but in fact play little or no role in the audit
process. As a result, the chief audit partners have a larger number of publicly-listed clients in their
portfolios than the other signing partners. Gul et al. (2012) believe that the characteristics of other
signing audit partners rather than the chief audit partner affect audit quality in these clients. They,
therefore, choose to focus on the audit partners with fewer clients.
Gul et al. (2012) collected information from ten companies and identified the signing
partners. They find that in these companies the chief partners have more publicly-listed clients
than the other signing partners. To provide a robust test of my hypothesis, I follow the approach
used by Gul et al. (2012) and focus on audit partners with fewer clients. The regression results are
presented in Table 9
The findings in Table 9 are generally consistent with those of the main test. One exception
is the regression analysis of SP. In the period after the reform, the coefficients on wealth and
wealth-squared of an audit partner are no longer significant. However, compared with the results
in Table 6, the magnitude of the coefficient on wealth in the regression with abnormal accruals
from the pre-2010 period is larger, which suggests that the income effect on the audit partners with
fewer clients is not as pronounced as the one on the chief audit partner. This may be because the
audit partners with fewer clients are relatively young, in the early stages of their career, and may
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have less accumulated wealth. In contrast, the significant coefficients on the two measures of
client-portfolio size of a partner in Table 8 are generally larger than those in Table 6, consistent
with the assumption of Gul et al. (2012) that audit partner with fewer clients do the most detailed
audit work, and the size of their client portfolio has a large impact on their efforts.
6.2 Complexity Score
In my main test, the total assets of the client portfolio for an audit partner are used as a
proxy for the magnitude of the busyness effect. The underlying assumption is that larger firms are
more complex and demand more effort and work hours. But the total assets of a client may not
provide enough information about the complexity of the audit work required. Following the
research by Gul et al. (2012), I construct a client complexity score that better captures the
differences in the complexity of clients audited by different audit partners.
Base on prior studies (e.g., Gul et al. 2003; Gul and Goodwin 2010), four client
characteristics that reflect client complexity and affect audit partners’ effort are identified: client
size, client growth, client financial performance, and bankruptcy risk. For each firm-year
observation, I set up four indicator variables to measure differences in the four client characteristics:
C1 = 1 if a firm is a large client (size of total assets in the upper quartile in year t), 0 otherwise;
C2 = 1 if a firm is a high-growth firm (growth in revenue in the upper quartile in year t), 0
otherwise;
C3 =1 if a firm has a high bankruptcy risk (bankruptcy risk in the upper quartile in year t),
measured by the Olson bankruptcy risk metric, calculated as the sum of 0.2086*equity
divided by liability, 4.3465*assets turnover, and 4.8601*assets growth (Wang and
Campbell 2010), 0 otherwise;
C4 =1 if a firm has low or negative profit (ROA < -10% in year t), 0 otherwise.
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The complexity score is then calculated as the sum of four scores plus 1:
Complexity score=1+ C1 + C2 + C3 + C4.
A firm can obtain a score of 1 to 5, reflecting the level of complexity. A higher complexity
score (e.g., 5) indicates that the client firm is more complex and demands more auditor effort. For
a less complex client with small size, low growth, low bankruptcy risk and high profit, the
complexity score equals 1. Finally, for each audit partner, I calculate the total complexity score of
all clients audited by the partner in year t. The regression results are presented in Table 10.
Similar to the results in the main test, the coefficients on complexity in the regression of
abnormal accruals and small profit are positive and significant, which suggests that audit partners
with more complex client portfolios tend to be associated with lower audit quality; this confirms
the busyness effect. The result for the regression analyzing MAO issuance in the prior period
suggests that complexity score is negatively associated with the probability of issuing an MAO.
6.3 An Alternative Measure of Wealth
In the main test, I use the cumulative sum of total audit fees earned by an audit partner
from all prior periods as a proxy for his/her wealth. It is assumed that the audit partner receives all
the audit fees from his/her portfolio of clients. In fact, the compensation plan in an audit firm
generally is a mix of performance-based and equal-sharing systems. Prior studies find that the
characteristics of the client portfolio of an audit partner represent an important factor in the
allocation of fees. Intuitively an audit partner with a large and complex portfolio of clients should
receive a larger portion of the total audit fees. Therefore, I use the complexity score constructed in
the previous section reflects the allocation of the audit fees in an audit firm. First, I calculate the
total complexity score for all the clients of an audit firm. Second, I calculate the compensation
received by an audit partner to be proportionate to the complexity of his/her portfolio as a fraction
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of the total complexity score for all clients of the firm. The regression results are presented in Table
11
The results are similar to those in the main test. One difference here is that the results on
small profits are not significant.
6.4 The Test of Quadratic Function Form in the Period Before 2010 Change in Legal Form
of Audit Firms
To rule out the possibility that the significant results of quadratic form in the period after
the 2010 reform may be due to the functional form, I ran the same quadratic regression in the
period before 2010 reform. The results are presented in Table 12. The regression results for MAO
and SP suggest that the coefficients on both wealth and Wealth_sq are not significant. The
coefficient on the term of Wealth_sq for AbAcc is not significant.
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Chapter 7: Summary and Conclusions
This study responds to the calls for research at the audit partner level of DeFond and Francis
(2005). Three dimensions of the size of an auditor are examined, including the personal wealth of
an audit partner, the size of the client portfolio of an audit partner, and the number of audit partners.
Based on the framework commonly used in labor economics, I develop a simple model to explore
the relation between auditor size and audit quality at the partner level. The model demonstrates
that the wealth of a partner exerts two types of effect on audit quality: the income effect and the
substitution effect. The substitution effect is the same as the bonding effect discussed in the prior
literature. But the income effect is relevant only at the partner level and not at the firm level, since
an audit partner as an individual has to decide how much work-time to spend on an audit job at the
expense of leisure. Wealthier audit partners have more income to consume, and so value leisure
time more than less wealthy partners do.
Using the sample from China where the identity of the engagement audit partner is required
to be disclosed, this study examines the effect of wealth on audit quality as measured by the
issuance of modified audit opinion, abnormal accruals, and the presence of small profits. In 2010,
Chinese government regulation required the transformation of all audit firms into limited liability
partnerships. Prior to this regulation, most audit firms were organized in the form of limited
liability corporations, in which the wealth of a partner is protected from legal liability. Thus, in the
period before the regulation, the personal wealth of an audit partner affected audit quality through
the income effect. I document that greater partner wealth was at that time associated with higher
abnormal accruals. This result provides evidence for the income effect and suggests that leisure is
a normal good for Chinese audit partners. In the period following the 2010 regulation, both the
income effect and the substitution effect influence audit quality. The labor economics literature
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generally assumes that there is an inverted-U-shape relationship between wages and supply of
labor. Using the quadratic form regression, I find that as wealth increases, audit quality in terms
of abnormal accruals also increases, but that after a certain point quality begins to decline.
I also discuss the relation between client portfolio size and audit quality and posit that there
are two different types of effect: quasi-rents, and the busyness effect. I use two criteria to determine
the portfolio size: the total assets of the client portfolio of an audit partner, which proxiy for the
busyness effect; and the total audit fees from the client portfolio of an audit partner, which proxy
for total quasi-rents. My results demonstrate that a partner with higher total assets in his/her
portfolio exhibits lower audit quality and a partner who earns higher audit fees exhibits higher
audit quality. In addition, by collecting the data about the number of audit partners in an audit firm
I find that the number of audit partners is negatively associated with audit quality in terms of
abnormal accrual and the probability of having small profits.
This study contributes to the debate about the disclosure requirements of the identities of
engagement audit partners by several regulatory authorities around the world. The empirical
findings in this study suggest that audit quality is affected in several ways both by the audit
partner’s size and by the size of the audit firm. The disclosure of an audit partner’s identity,
therefore, may provide additional useful information for financial information users. My paper
highlights the importance of examining audit quality at the partner level. I also provide direct
evidence that the wealth of an audit partner produces a substitution effect and an income effect on
the quality of audits. Using the framework used in labor economics enables me to extend the prior
literature on audit quality and provide a new perspective. Other issues widely studied in labor
economics--such as education, on-the-job training, income tax rates, and so on--may be also
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important for research on audit partners. Theories developed in labor economics may shed
additional light on auditing research in general.
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Appendix: Variable Definition
AbAcc
The absolute value of the regression residuals estimated by
the Dechow and Dichev (2002) model
MAO
Modified audit opinion, a dichotomous variable that takes the
value of 1 if a client receives a modified opinion, and 0
otherwise
SP
Small profits, an indicator variable that equals 1 if the client
has reported an ROA(net income divided by average total
assets) of between zero and one percent, and 0 otherwise
Wealth
The natural logarithm of the cumulative sum of audit fees an
audit partner has earned up until the current year
Nclient
The number of publicly-listed clients audited by the partner
Sclient
The total assets of the client portfolio of an audit partner
Qclient
The natural logarithm of all audit fees earned from all
publicly-listed clients of an audit partner in a year
Sfirm
The client portfolio size of an audit firm
NPartners
The number of audit partners in an audit firm
Quick
The sum of cash, short-term investments, notes receivable,
and accounts receivable divided by current liabilities
ROA
Net income divided by average total assets
Leverage
Leverage ratio computed as total liabilities divided by total
assets at the end of the year
Loss
An indicator for clients with losses
Complexity
The sum of accounts receivable and inventories divided by
total assets
State
An indicator variable for firms that are ultimately controlled
by local or central governments
Big4
An indicator for a Big 4 auditor
Expertise
An indicator that is equal to 1 if a partner is a al first-ranked
auditor by market share in an industry
Experience
The number of years that the signing auditors appear in the
database
AFTenure
The number of consecutive years that the audit firm has
audited the client
APTenure
The number of consecutive years that the audit partners have
signed the client’s annual audit report
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Table 1: Sample Selection
# of observations
Panel A Sample Selections
Initial Observations available from 2007 to 2009
10,105
Less: observations with B shares
(114)
Less: observation with unlimited liability partnerships
(1,443)
Less: observations with missing audit fee information
(1,080)
Less: observations with missing industry information
(66)
Less: observations with missing financial statement or income
(20)
statement
Final Sample
7,382
# of observations
Panel B Sample Selections
Initial Observations available from 2010 to 2012
14,511
Less: observations with B shares
(200)
Less: observations with missing audit fee information
(2,242)
Less: observations with missing industry information
(106)
Less: observations with missing financial statement or income
(69)
statement
Final Sample
11,894
Panel C Distribution of Sample Observations by Year
Year
# of observations
2007
2,123
2008
2,700
2009
2,559
Total
7,382
2010
3,363
2011
3,898
2012
4,633
Total
11,894
B shares in China refer to shares that are traded in foreign currencies and are limited to foreign
investors.
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Table 2: Descriptive Statistics
Panel A: Wealth by a Partner by Year
Year
Min
Max
Mean
Median
2007
11.98
19.04
15.97
16.08
2008
11.85
19.07
15.91
16.02
2009
12.10
19.05
15.80
15.94
2010
11.98
19.07
15.74
15.89
2011
11.92
19.04
15.41
15.61
2012
12.21
19.23
15.43
15.55
Panel B: Total Assets of the Client Portfolio of an Audit Partner by Year
Year
Min
Max
Mean
Median
2007
16.25
29.79
22.75
22.81
2008
15.38
29.91
22.74
22.74
2009
15.47
28.44
22.71
22.76
2010
13.08
30.23
22.95
23.03
2011
15.72
28.29
22.88
22.88
2012
15.73
30.18
23.04
23.05
Panel C: All Audit Fees Made from the Client Portfolio by an Audit Partner
Year
Min
Max
Mean
Median
2007
10.71
17.57
13.92
13.91
2008
11.51
17.37
14.03
14.00
2009
11.51
17.31
14.01
13.99
2010
11.70
17.52
14.12
14.09
2011
11.92
17.52
14.14
14.12
2012
11.98
19.16
14.38
14.40
Panel D: All Other Variables
Variables
Min
Max
Stdev
Mean
Median
Sfirm
19.17
31.99
1.62
27.24
27.16
Quick
0.14
6.85
1.55
1.25
0.70
ROA
-0.06
0.14
0.05
0.04
0.04
Leverage
0.10
0.87
0.21
0.48
0.49
Complexity
0.02
0.61
0.17
0.26
0.24
Loss
0.00
1.00
0.30
0.10
0.00
State
0
1
0.50
0.45
0
Big4
0
1
0.21
0.04
0
Expertise
0
1
0.10
0.01
0
Experience
0
20
4.94
5.94
5
AFTenure
0
20
2.97
2.64
2
APTenure
0
18
3.13
2.34
1
SP
0
1
0.31
0.11
0
AbAcc
0.00
0.23
0.06
0.06
0.04
MAO
0
1
0.24
0.06
0
Size
11.35
28.41
1.32
21.64
21.54
65

Npartners
1
163
47.22
77.64
76
See the Appendix for variable definitions. All continuous variables are winsorized at the first and
99th percentiles of their respective annual distribution.
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Table 3: Bivariate Results
Panel A: Sample for the Period from 2007 to 2009
Variables
1st Quartile
2nd Quartile
3rd Quartile
4th Quartile
AbAcc
Mean
0.060
0.062
0.066
0.073
MAO
Mean
0.088
0.086
0.067
0.053
SP
Mean
0.097
0.117
0.122
0.132
Panel B: Sample for the Period from 2010 to 2012
Variables
1st Quartile
2nd Quartile
3rd Quartile
4th Quartile
AbAcc
Mean
0.055
0.046
0.043
0.051
MAO
Mean
0.061
0.047
0.053
0.039
SP
Mean
0.113
0.109
0.108
0.087
The sample is ranked according to the wealth of an audit partner and is divided into four subsamples. The average AbAcc, MAO, and SP are calculated for each sub-sample

67

Table 4 Correlation Table
1
2
1 MAO
1.00
2 AbAcc
0.35
1.00
3 SP
0.01
0.01
4 Wealth
-0.04 -0.06
5 Sclient
-0.15 -0.29
6 Qclient
-0.07 -0.14
7 Sfirm
-0.09 -0.16
8 Quick
-0.11 0.07
9 ROA
-0.20 -0.01
10 Size
-0.31 -0.60
11Leverage
0.25
-0.05
12Complexity -0.10 -0.10
13State
-0.05 -0.16
14Big4
-0.04 -0.11
15Expertise
-0.02 -0.04
16AFTenure -0.01 -0.03
17APTenure -0.03 -0.05
18Experience -0.02 -0.02
19 LOSS
0.33
0.15

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

1.00
-0.02
-0.01
-0.02
-0.03
-0.11
-0.27
0.01
0.14
0.00
0.05
-0.03
-0.01
0.02
0.03
0.00
-0.12

1.00
0.62
0.67
0.08
-0.07
0.03
0.14
0.04
-0.03
0.04
0.12
0.06
0.08
0.41
0.68
-0.03

1.00
0.68
0.27
-0.08
0.04
0.53
0.12
-0.02
0.16
0.24
0.12
0.07
0.20
0.36
-0.08

1.00
0.29
0.00
0.04
0.28
0.02
-0.02
0.01
0.22
0.13
0.06
0.22
0.43
-0.04

1.00
0.08
0.06
0.30
-0.05
-0.01
0.06
0.54
0.12
-0.08
-0.04
-0.02
-0.05

1.00
0.29
-0.21
-0.69
-0.16
-0.21
-0.06
-0.02
-0.14
-0.14
0.00
-0.14

1.00
0.06
-0.39
-0.05
-0.10
0.05
0.01
-0.03
-0.02
0.02
-0.62

1.00
0.25
0.03
0.29
0.33
0.15
0.10
0.08
0.01
-0.16

1.00
0.20
0.20
0.04
0.03
0.08
0.08
-0.01
0.22

1.00
-0.06
-0.05
-0.02
-0.06
-0.04
-0.03
-0.06

1.00
0.10
0.05
0.07
0.07
-0.02
0.02

1.00
0.20
0.10
-0.06
-0.07
-0.02

1.00
0.03
-0.01
-0.04
-0.01

1.00
0.26
0.08
-0.01

1.00
0.52
-0.01

1.00
-0.01

1
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Table 5: Modified Audit Opinions
Dependent Variable: Modified Audit Opinion
Prior
Coefficient
z-statistics
Wealth
-0.0824
(-0.91)
Wealth_sq
Sclient
0.0169
(0.22)
Qclient
0.114*
(1.73)
Sfirm
-0.0882
(-1.12)
Size
-0.935***
(-11.88)
Quick
-0.409*
(-1.70)
ROA
2.255
(1.30)
Leverage
5.115***
(10.26)
Complexity
-3.427***
(-7.37)
State
-0.137
(-1.10)
Big4
0.145
(0.25)
Expertise
-0.331
(-0.60)
AFTenure
-0.0363
(-1.59)
APTenure
-0.00132
(-0.05)
LOSS
1.712***
(8.25)
Experience
-0.00428
(-0.21)
Constant
16.73***
(8.67)
Year/industry fixed
Yes
effects
Observations
7,382
2
Pseudo R
43.12%
z-statistics in parentheses
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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Post
Coefficient
1.945
-0.0721
-0.0846
0.219*
0.0610
-1.166***
0.0159
-1.360
5.075***
-3.337***
0.202
0.828**
1.535**
-0.0257
-0.0521**
1.443***
0.0529***
3.863
Yes
11,894
45.44%

z-statistics
(1.11)
(-1.19)
(-1.21)
(1.67)
(1.36)
(-17.99)
(0.25)
(-0.68)
(13.16)
(-7.58)
(1.63)
(2.14)
(2.32)
(-1.11)
(-2.26)
(6.94)
(2.88)
(0.53)

Table 6: Discretionary Accrual
Dependent Variable: AbAcc
Prior
Wealth
Wealth_sq
Sclient
Qclient
Sfirm
Quick
ROA
Size
Leverage
Complexity
State
Big4
Expertise
AFTenure
APTenure
Experience
LOSS
Constant
Year/industry fixed
effects
Observations
Adjusted R2
t-statistics in parentheses

Post

Coefficient
0.00292***

t-statistics
(3.04)

0.0163***
-0.0104***
-0.000930
0.00496***
0.155***
-0.527***
0.0200***
-0.0362***
-0.0164***
-0.0120***
-0.00277
-0.000250
-0.00105***
0.000198
0.0341***
0.391***
Yes

(18.32)
(-7.52)
(-1.62)
(5.10)
(7.21)
(-11.63)
(3.70)
(-7.48)
(-12.29)
(-3.75)
(-0.61)
(-1.10)
(-4.23)
(0.98)
(11.56)
(19.14)

7,382
17.1%

Coefficient
-0.0282***
0.00103***
0.0164***
-0.00993***
-0.00243***
0.00229***
0.0566***
-0.689***
0.0199***
-0.0453***
-0.00699***
0.000982
-0.00453
0.00000489
-0.000793***
0.000328**
0.0257***
0.568***
Yes
11,894
17.5%

* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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t-statistics
(-3.98)
(4.40)
(23.40)
(-8.99)
(-5.84)
(5.68)
(3.44)
(-7.88)
(4.56)
(-12.05)
(-6.96)
(0.45)
(-1.32)
(0.03)
(-4.65)
(2.37)
(10.78)
(9.49)

Table 7: Small Profits
Dependent Variable: Small Profits
Wealth
Wealth_sq
Sclient
Qclient
Sfirm
Quick
ROA
Leverage
Complexity
Size
State
Big4
Expertise
AFTenure
APTenure
Experience
Constant
Year/industry fixed
effects
Observations
Pseudo R2

Prior
Coefficient
0.0727
0.0866**
-0.259***
0.00876
-0.0655
-17.22***
-0.365
0.293
-0.721***
0.123
-0.689**
0.310
0.00303
-0.0103
0.00839
-1.765
Yes

Post
z-statistics
(1.22)
(1.96)
(-3.39)
(0.27)
(-0.96)
(-25.80)
(-1.28)
(1.06)
(-25.76)
(1.52)
(-2.18)
(0.78)
(0.22)
(-0.64)
(0.64)
(-1.47)

7,382
9.65%

Coefficient
-1.266**
0.0485**
0.111***
0.0526
-0.0166
-0.0913**
-23.14***
0.412*
-0.169
-0.243***
0.147**
-0.260
-0.366
0.0210*
0.0379***
0.00660
-12.03***
Yes
11,894
15.51%

t-statistics in parentheses
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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z-statistics
(-2.15)
(2.47)
(2.79)
(0.68)
(-0.60)
(-2.07)
(-30.89)
(1.68)
(-0.71)
(-20.76)
(2.05)
(-1.22)
(-0.80)
(1.91)
(3.15)
(0.59)
(-2.60)

Table 8: The Analysis of the Number of Audit Partners
MAO
AbAcc
Coefficient
z-statistics
Coefficient
t-statistics
Wealth
1.492
(1.01)
-0.0398***
(-3.47)
Wealth_sq
-0.0481
(-0.97)
0.00139***
(3.66)
Sclient
-0.923***
(-7.14)
0.0168***
(12.39)
Qclient
0.901***
(3.51)
-0.0125***
(-5.71)
Sfirm
-0.0764
(-0.96)
-0.00362***
(-4.57)
NParnters
0.00314
(1.32)
0.0000734***
(3.79)
Quick
0.180**
(1.99)
0.00194***
(3.13)
ROA
-4.881
(-1.29)
0.0469*
(1.72)
Leverage
5.182***
(6.68)
0.0147**
(1.97)
Complexity
-4.201***
(-5.56)
-0.0390***
(-6.37)
State
-0.0316
(-0.15)
-0.00375**
(-2.18)
Big4
-0.651
(-1.09)
-0.00247
(-0.76)
Size
-1.143***
(-9.04)
-0.246***
(-8.65)
Expertise
1.246*
(1.72)
-0.00912*
(-1.70)
AFTenure
-0.0118
(-0.33)
0.000136
(0.52)
APTenure
-0.0816***
(-2.63)
-0.000735***
(-2.77)
Experience
0.0456*
(1.69)
0.000163
(0.75)
LOSS
1.319***
(3.94)
0.0192***
(5.61)
Constant
-5.894
(-0.49)
0.619***
(6.60)
Year/industry
Yes
Yes
fixed effects
Observations
4,322
4,551
2
Adjusted R
28.73%
13.9%
t-statistics/z-statistics in parentheses
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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SP
Coefficient z-statistics
1.175
(1.20)
-0.0428
(-1.32)
-0.0888
(-1.15)
0.137
(0.98)
-0.127**
(-2.51)
0.00337**
(2.42)
-0.0261
(-0.40)
-19.44***
(-17.84)
1.967***
(5.06)
-0.0106
(-0.03)
0.116
(1.02)
-0.452
(-1.21)
-0.178
(-11.24)
-0.532
(-0.63)
0.0259
(1.55)
0.0474***
(2.59)
0.00538
(0.31)
-7.294
Yes
4,385
16.09%

(-0.97)

Table 9: Audit Partners with fewer Clients
MAO

Wealth

Qclient
Sfirm
Control
Variables
Constant
Observations
Year/industry
fixed effects
Adjusted
Pseudo R2

SP

Post

Prior

Post

Prior

Post

0.0527
(0.42)

0.0444
(0.03)
-0.00964
(-0.17)
-0.300**
(-2.26)
0.561**
(2.38)
0.0902
(1.36)

0.00152**
(2.43)

0.0486
(0.53)

0.0254***
(18.30)
-0.0165***
(-7.08)
-0.00144
(-1.54)

-0.0712***
(-5.27)
0.00248***
(5.31)
0.0222***
(18.89)
-0.0150***
(-7.57)
-0.00217***
(-3.26)

1.400
(1.27)
-0.0537
(-1.42)
0.0986*
(1.66)
0.0477
(0.35)
-0.0313
(-0.71)

Yes

Yes

Yes

14.29***
(4.92)
2,544
Yes

14.55
(1.21)
4,358
Yes

0.515***
(13.26)
2,949
Yes

0.855***
(8.27)
4,576
Yes

-1.181
(-0.55)
2,510
Yes

-13.19
(-1.58)
4,463
Yes

40.43%

45.48%

25.3%

24.1%

9.82%

15.25%

Wealth_sq
Sclient

AbAcc

Prior

-0.127
(-0.90)
0.378***
(4.64)
-0.143*
(-1.91)
Yes

t-statistics in parentheses
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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0.130*
(1.72)
-0.335**
(-2.37)
0.0261
(0.46)
Yes

Yes

Table 10: Complexity Score
MAO

Wealth

Qclient
Sfirm
Control
Variables
Constant
Observations
Year/industry
fixed effects
Adjusted
/Pseudo R2

SP

Post

Prior

Post

Prior

Post

0.00860
(0.07)

0.00227
(1.50)
0.00975***
(7.50)
-0.0194***
(-8.28)
0.0000467
(0.04)
Yes

-0.0581***
(-3.86)
0.00198***
(3.84)
0.00627***
(6.05)
-0.0161***
(-8.80)
-0.00201***
(-2.82)
Yes

0.0653
(0.71)

0.116
(0.98)
0.138
(0.63)
0.128*
(1.73)
Yes

0.927
(0.50)
-0.0405
(-0.62)
0.143
(1.20)
0.0537
(0.24)
0.109*
(1.65)
Yes

0.0162***
(3.19)
-0.180
(-1.30)
0.0228
(0.40)
Yes

0.745
(0.68)
-0.0310
(-0.83)
0.214***
(2.71)
-0.347***
(-2.66)
-0.0403
(-0.92)
Yes

13.51***
(4.00)
7,282
Yes

11.44
(0.86)
11,394
Yes

0.499***
(14.45)
7,352
Yes

0.709***
(6.23)
11,844
Yes

0.703
(0.34)
7,322
Yes

-9.651
(-1.18)
11,594
Yes

40.44%

45.26%

12.1%

12.3%

9.67%

15.44%

Wealth_sq
Tcomplexity

AbAcc

Prior

t-statistics/z-statistics in parentheses
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01

74

Table 11: Alternative Measure of Wealth
MAO
Prior
Post
Wealth
0.0801
-2.002
(0.60)
(-1.12)
Wealth_sq
0.0816
(1.25)
Sclient
-0.152
-0.341***
(-1.06)
(-2.59)
Qclient
0.406*
0.270
(1.80)
(1.37)
Sfirm
0.148*
0.0882
(1.94)
(1.30)
Yes
Yes
Control
Variables
Constant
14.73***
29.48**
(4.41)
(2.33)
Observations 7282
11394
Year/industry
Yes
Yes
fixed effects
Adjusted R2
30.32%
45.54%

AbAcc
Prior
Post
0.00886***
-0.0240***
(5.45)
(-3.57)
0.00119**
(2.14)
0.0257***
0.0228***
(18.62)
(19.54)
-0.0131***
-0.0123***
(-5.72)
(-7.01)
-0.00181*
-0.00270***
(-1.95)
(-4.02)
Yes

Yes

SP
Prior
-0.0866
(-0.75)

Post
0.0349
(0.03)

0.140*
(1.83)
-0.263*
(-1.92)
0.0336
(0.59)

0.111*
(1.86)
0.0117
(0.10)
-0.0145
(-0.32)

Yes

Yes

0.471***
(12.33)
7352
Yes

0.521***
(4.81)
11844
Yes

-0.697
(-0.35)
7322
Yes

-2.272
(-0.29)
11594
Yes

11.28%

13.9%

6.13%

12.36%

t-statistics/z-statistics in parentheses
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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Table 12: The Test of Quadratic Function Form in the Period before 2010 Reform
(1)
(2)
(3)
MAO
AbAcc
SP
Wealth
0.771
(0.74)
0.0331*
(1.94)
1.495
(0.41)
Wealth_sq
-0.0283
(-0.83)
-0.00118
(-0.37)
-0.0466 (-0.81)
Sclient
0.0179
(0.23)
0.0164***
(18.61) 0.0908** (2.03)
Qclient
0.134
(1.09)
-0.00965*** (-7.00) -0.236*** (-2.99)
Sfirm
0.0866*
(1.89)
-0.000995*
(-1.73)
0.0112
(0.35)
Control
Yes
Yes
Yes
Variables
Constant
9.646
(1.18)
0.675***
(7.32)
-12.07** (-2.04)
Observations
7382
7382
7382
Year/industry
Yes
Yes
Yes
fixed effects
Adjusted/Pse
43.14%
17.3%
9.68%
duo R2
t /z statistics in parentheses
*
p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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